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ABSTRACT: Nuclear safety is aimed at preventing 
accidents while nuclear security is aimed at preventing 
intentional human acts that might cause accident in the 
nuclear facility. Consequently, safety is mainly a technical 
issue while security is mostly connected with intelligence. 
Both of them have the same goal which comprises 
protection of the nuclear facility, public and environment. 
However, safety and security in nuclear power sector 
have been treated separately. In recent years there is an 
initiative for their integration. The idea of combining 
safety and security is not very new but neither is 
straightforward to be achieved.The paper deals with 
some commonalities and differences between nuclear 
safety and nuclear security concepts and argues the 
roomfor their possible integration 
KEYWORDS: nuclear safety, nuclear security 
Introduction 
Operation of nuclear facilities requires careful attention to 
safeguards, safety and security.The overall approachis well 
known as the 3S conceptthat has been established in 
nuclear power sector over several decades. 
Safeguards are aimed at preventing the diversion of nuclear 
materials for nuclear weapons purposes, safety is aimed at 
preventing nuclear or radiological accidents and security is  
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 aimed at preventing intentional human acts that might harm 
nuclear facility. That is why safeguards have political 
implications principally, safety is mainly a technical issue 
and security is mostly connected with intelligence services. 
Although these activities have a different focus, they overlap 
with each other. All of them contribute the overall goal which 
comprises protection of the nuclear facility, public and 
environment. Protective measures that are taken in these 
different but connected fields have a number of common 
features. They require a similar discipline and culture that 
are built on years of experience. So, there must be 
synergies in approaches, particularly in the regulatory area. 
Safeguards relate to the protection against misuse of 
nuclear facilities and the diversion of significant quantities of 
nuclear material3 from peaceful use. In 1953, US President 
Eisenhower announced the Atom for Peace program to 
promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy while 
demanding non-proliferation i.e. preventing and discouraging 
any further military use4. In 1968 the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature 
and entered into force in 1970. So, the application of 
safeguards is a consequence of a political choice of a state 
to be party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
This paper focuses on the interface between safety and 
security at nuclear power sector with the aim of ensuring 
that, as security framework matures, safety and security 
obligations serve to reinforce each other. Measures related 
to safeguards also contribute to the overall goal of protecting 
public and environment but have not similar interfaces with 
safety and security. This is the main reason why safeguards 
hereafter are not discussed. The majority of thoughts and 
3 Significant quantities of nuclear material are: 8 kg for plutonium and uranium 
233; 25 kg of high-enriched uranium 235 (20% or more); 75 kg for low-
enriched uranium 235; 10 t for natural and 20 t for depleted uranium and 
thorium [1]. 
4 USA (1948), Soviet Union (1949), UK (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India 
(1974), Pakistan (1998), Republic of North Korea (2006) are proven nuclear 
weapons states. Upon the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 there were 
nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine but were returned to 
the Russian Federation as the successor of the former Soviet Union by 
1996. Israel is believed to possess nuclear explosive devices but has never 
carried out a nuclear test. South Africa had a nuclear weapons program but 




































r ideas shortly described in the paper are taken from [3] and 
INSAG5-24 Report [4]. 
Safety and Security Definitions 
Nuclear safety encompasses all technical and organizational 
measures taken during planning, design, construction, 
operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities to 
protect public and environment against technological 
risks.On the other hand, nuclear security indicates measures 
to protect public, facilities and nuclear material against 
unauthorized human interface. Examples are negligence, 
theft, sabotage and terrorist acts.The following definitions of 
nuclear safety and nuclear security are found in the IAEA 
Safety Glossary [2]: 
1. Nuclear safety - The achievement of proper
operating conditions, prevention of accidents or
mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in
protection of workers, the public and the
environment from undue radiation hazards.
2. Nuclear Security - The prevention and detection of,
and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized
access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts
involving nuclear material, other radioactive
substances or their associated facilities.
Safety and Security Regimes 
The global nuclear safety regime is made up of complex 
relationships that serve to enhance safety in nuclear power 
sector. It started at the early beginning of nuclear power 
sector development, which may be placed in early sixties of 
the last century. The global nuclear security regime is not as 
mature as the global nuclear safety regime.Its onset 
coincides with the adoption of the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which falls in the 
early eighties of the last century. 
The nuclear safety and nuclear security regimes arebased 
on a number of international legal instruments (conventions, 
5 INSAG stands for International Nuclear Safety Group. It is an IAEA (International 
Atomic Energy Agency) group of experts with high professional competence 
in the field of nuclear safety. They hold periodical meetings discussing 


































 resolutions and codes of conduct).The following international 
instruments relate to nuclear safety: 
1. Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994;
2. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management, 1997; and
3. Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research
Reactors, 2004.
The following international instruments relate to nuclear 
security: 
1. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, 1980;
2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
2001;
3. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,
2004;
4. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, 2005; and
5. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005.
The following international instruments are relevant to both 
nuclear safety and nuclear security: 
1. Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear
Accident, 1986;
2. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency, 1986; and
3. Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources, 2004.
Responsibilities for Safety and Security 
Both nuclear safety and nuclear security are built on a legal 
and regulatory framework. That framework defines the 
responsibilities of several organizations involved. These 





































r 1. the State; 
2. Regulatory authority or authorities; and 
3. Operating organization(s). 
The State must set up an appropriate legislative and 
regulatory framework to ensure control of nuclear power 
sector that includes the transport and uses of nuclear 
material. This requires safety and security provisions. 
Among others, the State must designate a regulatory body in 
both the safety and security fields and provide the regulator 
with the authority and competence, financial and human 
resources necessary to accomplish their objectives. 
Particularly the State must define rules for confidentiality and 
information protection in the safety and security area and 
carry out checks to ensure the trustworthiness of personnel. 
The last one has been applying in security area particularly. 
The regulatory authority must define the requirements to be 
satisfied by the operator(s) for both safety and security. The 
regulatory authority must also set up and implement a 
licensing system as well as the inspection and enforcement 
system. Theregulator must ensure that an adequate 
emergency response system is in place,including various 
off-site elements that are not the responsibility of the 
operator(s) but the State agencies and institutions.In both 
the safety and security fields the regulator must also observe 
internationalcommitments. It is important to note here that 
because the close relationship between safety and security, 
many countries see advantages in having a single regulator 
responsible for both. 
The operating organization has the prime responsibility for 
the safety and security in the nuclear power sector. In the 
case of safety, the operator's responsibility may be limited to 
defense against a design basis accident (DBA) while in the 
case of security, the operator'sresponsibility may be limited 
to defense against a design basis threat (DBT). 
Thisallocation of responsibility reflects the reality that 
operating staff are in the bestposition to identify the risks 
arising at the nuclear facility and to ensurecompliance with 
regulatory requirements. Operator should have a centralized 
information system and a centralized command centre for 



































 Safety and Security Concepts 
Broadly speaking, safety is concerned with protecting the 
environment from the nuclear facility whereas security is 
concerned with protecting the nuclear facility from the 
environment. However, both of them are applying defense in 
depth philosophy concept. Because of that, there is 
considerable overlap between safety and security 
approaches although the focus is different. 
Many commonalities between safety and security are 
frequently obscured by the use of different terminology. 
Thus, to achieve a shared understanding of the key 
concepts within each field, there is a need to establish a 
common language. 
Dependency of Safety and Security 
Safety and security are interdependent, meaning there is a 
bidirectional relationship between them i.e. each is 
dependent on the other. The basic question raised here is 
the following: If the nuclear facility is not secure, is it safe? It 
is noted in [3] that stakeholders are beginning to argue that if 
it is not secure, it is not safe. On the other hand, it should be 
pretty clear that safety is an unquestionable condition for the 
nuclear facility to be secure. 
In particular, one of the major impacts of interdependency 
between safety and security is that a security system needs 
to cope with evolving threats and changes to the 
environment through the nuclear facility lifetime. It is 
important for the nuclear facility to remain safe and secure 
despite such changes. In other words,it is important for the 
nuclear facilityto be resilient to change. 
Safety and Security Principles 
There are many overlaps between safety and 
securityprinciples, but there are also some significant 
differences and potential conflicts. For example, defense 
indepth is an important architectural principle for both safety 
andsecurity that depends on the use of multiple and 
independent barriers. However, securityconsiderations are 






































r Perhaps the most radical security principles from a safety 
perspective are those that are based on Kerchoffs’ axiom6. 
The axiom is dealing with contraryrequirement which 
underline open facility design on one side,and its easy and 
fast recovery on the other. The axiom mentioned could have 
far reaching impact on the architecture of safety. 
Moreover, changes to threats over the lifetime of thenuclear 
facility will probably mean that safety, that wasinitially 
adequate, will need to be taken into reconsideration. This 
may have significant implications to the architecture and 
lifecycle of embedded safety where design life may be 40 
years or even more. 
Safety and Security Methodologies 
Risk assessment is a fundamental step in safety and 
security analysis, but the underlying threats 
modelsarecompletely different. However, they use similar 
techniques to identify potential failures and assess their 
impact. So there is a need for a unified methodology for 
assessing the threats to the safety and security of the 
nuclear facility. 
Security considerations can have a significant impact on 
asafety case. For example, as mentioned previously, safety 
considerations may challenge the effectiveness and 
independence of safety barriers. This suggests a greater 
emphasis on resilience of the design. 
It is also necessary to consider the potential for terrorist 
attackduring a safety event. A fail-safe state of the nuclear 
facility may not be as safe asformerly thought if the facility is 
under terrorist attack. So, managing asafety event during a 
major security event should be taken into consideration as 
well. 
Given the importance of open designand easy recovery 
(Kerchoffs’ axiom), it is an appropriatequestion whether 
                     
6 Kerckhoff's axiom is the concept that a cryptographic system should be designed 
to be secure, even if all its details, except for the key, are publicly known. 
The axiom is invented in 1883 by AugusteKerckhoff, a Dutch linguist and 
cryptographer. The axiom, sometimes referred to as Kerckhoff'sprinciple or 
law, forms the basis of open security and security by design and contrasts 
directly with the deprecated security though obscurity model. American 
mathematician Claude Shannon further refined Kerckhoff’saxiom. 
Shannon’s maxim is saying the following: One ought to design systems 





































 security-informed safety cases should be disclosed. This 
question leads to the problem of sharing sensitive 
information about the nuclear facility. 
Safety and Security Culture 
Safety culture is defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary [2] as 
the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an 
overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance. Security culture 
has the same definition except for a focus on security 
issues. 
Safety and Security culture often involve individuals of 
diverse backgrounds and experiences. That is, security 
personnel, unlike safety personnel, often have military or 
police backgrounds. The safety personnel have mostly 
engineering background and are more typical of the ordinary 
population. 
One difference between the two cultures relates to the way 
information is handled. In the security field, the sharing of 
information should typically be restricted to a select group of 
individuals in order to prevent sensitive information related to 
protective measures or facility weaknesses. In contrast, the 
general rule in the safety area is to be transparent. 
Forexample, it may be particularly important to share 
feedback on experience, andthereby to prevent occurrences 
of incidents or accidents at one nuclear facility from being 
repeated at others. 
Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Operators as well as State authorities are required to 
develop plans to limitthe consequences of a nuclear or 
radiological accident. Such plans should encompass 
bothsafety and security events. 
Emergency preparedness and response plans in the field of 
safety andsecurity need to be well coordinated with all 
relevant entities. These plans should be complementary and 
coherent.To ensure that emergency decisionsreflect an 
awareness of both security and safety considerations, the 
operatorshould centralize decision making process. It should 
be underlined here that emergency preparedness and 







































Safety and security in nuclear power sector have been 
treated separately. These two concepts have certain 
commonalities but certain differences as well. Bridging the 
gaps and integrating these two concepts to a certain degree 
are challenging task nowadays in the field. With respect to 
degree of integration that may be achieved, according to [4]a 
special attention is needed in relation to: 
• Differences in the State involvement - the State is 
directly involved in identifying a security event but 
has no similar role in safety event; 
• Differences in the information status - security 
information must be kept confidential, whereas 
safety information is generally transparent; and 
• Differences in the background of security and safety 
personnel - security personnel typically have a 
military or police background, whereas safety 
personnel are more typical of the general 
population. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize here a good example for 
full integration of nuclear safety and nuclear security that has 
already been achieved in the field of emergency 
preparedness and response to a nuclear or radiological 
accident. 
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